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Appellant and Petitioner, Neil R. Mitchell (NXMr.
Mitchell7') , hereby petitions this Court for rehearing of the
above-captioned appeal.

In support of this Petition, Mr.

Mitchell asserts the following points of law and fact which this
Court overlooked or misapprehended in issuing its Opinion filed
on May 16, 1996 (the "Opinion").
POINT I
THIS COURT'S ANALYSIS AS TO THE ESTATE
CHECKING ACCOUNT IS FLAWED.
Both this Court and the trial court acknowledge that by
failing to fund the Bypass Trust, as required by Grant Sims'
Will, Marjorie Sims breached her fiduciary duty as personal
representative under Grant's Will.

In exonerating her and her

Estate from that breach, this Court ignored and misperceived the
law and the facts as cited in Mr. Mitchell's briefs, in
interpreting the relevant testamentary language and its effect.
First, in the Opinion, this Court paraphrases the operative
provision of the Will and, by so doing, changes the meaning of
the provision.

With the language and the meaning altered, the

Court's analysis of the passage is incorrect.

The provision in

question states as follows:

1

For the convenience of the Court, the abbreviations
utilized in this Petition for Rehearing correspond directly to
those utilized in Appellant's briefs in this appeal.
2

[t]he Trustees shall distribute to her [Mrs. Sims]
without any conditions, all of the income of said
trust. The trustees shall also distribute as much of
the principal as is necessary for her proper health,
support, and maintenance and to maintain her in the
standard of living that she enjoyed during my lifetime.
After setting forth the full language of the provision, this
Court then paraphrases it as follows:
The language of the Will clearly states that Mrs. Sims
shall receive distributions from the principal of Mr.
Sims' Estate "necessary for her proper health, support,
and maintenance."
Significantly, the analysis omits the words "as is," which modify
and qualify the word "necessary."

This omission changes the

phrase's meaning entirely and transforms it into an unqualified
requirement for the trustee to distribute principal to Marge.
This paraphrasing fits the Court's ultimate conclusion that Marge
did no wrong, but does not square with the plain language of the
Will.
In the next sentence of the Opinion, the Court again alters
the language of the Will.

In responding to Mr. Mitchell's

argument that the phrase "as is necessary" requires the Trustee
to consider the beneficiary's independent resources before
distributing principal, the Court states:
We need not address that question because Mr. Sims'
Will does not merely authorize the invasion of the
principal for the "necessities of life."... Instead,
Mr. Sims' Will mandates that Mrs. Sims shall have
access to the principal "to maintain her [Mrs. Sims] in
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the standard of living that she enjoyed during my
lifetime."
Again, the Court omits the phrase "as is necessary" and glosses
over the issue.

The Court's rendition of the provision makes it

appear that Marge was to have unfettered access to the principal
of the Trust, which is not what is dictated by the plain language
of the Will.

Again, the alteration fits the Court's conclusion,

but not the reality of the Will.
Further, by omitting the "as is necessary" language from the
quote and focusing, instead, on the "shall distribute" language,
the Court expressly avoided addressing the core issue of the
meaning of the phrase "as is necessary" in this context.

The

Court's avoidance'of this analytical responsibility is improper,
particularly in an opinion designated for publication on an issue
never before addressed by the appellate courts of Utah.
This issue was squarely before the Court.

Ms. Wood cited

cases analyzing similar clauses, and Mr. Mitchell cited several
cases from other jurisdictions for the proposition that if a will
or trust contains an "as is necessary" clause, the trustee is
required or authorized to consider the beneficiary's independent
resources before invading principal.

2

See Appellant's Reply

Contrary to the Court's analysis, Mr. Mitchell did not
argue solely that Marge had to exhaust her resources before a
distribution of principal could be made. He also argued, based
on additional cases in his Reply brief, that the "as is
4

Brief, at pp. 8-14.

In fact, on pages 12 and 13 of his Reply

Brief, Mr. Mitchell cites three cases that hold that even if a
will states that the trustee "shall distribute" principal
payments, if the will also contains language that such
distributions are only to be made "as is necessary," the trustee
must examine the beneficiary's independent assets before making
such a distribution.

See In re Will of Flyer, 245 N.E.2d 718, "

720 (N.Y. 1969); Hull v. Holloway, 20 A. 445, 447 (Conn. 1889);
Stemple v. Middletown Trust Co., 15 A.2d 305, 307 (Conn. 1940).
Mr. Mitchell's well-supported position, therefore, makes
meaningless the distinction in the Opinion that because the Will
says "shall distribute" the Court need not address the meaning of
"as is necessary."
Mr. Mitchell also cites cases such as Security People's
Trust Company v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 40 (W.D. Pa. 1965),
that hold that a trustee of a testamentary trust has a fiduciary
responsibility to the remainder beneficiaries to ensure that
invasions of principal are proper.

In this case, had the Trust

been funded, Mr. Mitchell, as a co-trustee, would have owed the
same fiduciary duty to the Remainder Beneficiaries.

necessary" language would have entitled him, as one of the cotrustees of the Trust, to consider Marge's vast personal wealth
before invading the principal. The Court failed to even
recognize this important aspect of Mr. Mitchell's position.
5

This Court failed to address these arguments or attempt to
distinguish the cited case law.

Even though the Court chose not

to address the question of the meaning of the phrase "as is
necessary/' the issue was properly before the Court, and the
Court's failure to analyze it undermines the integrity and value
of the Opinion.
The second major flaw in the Court's analysis of Marge's
breach is its failure to examine or consider Grant's intent in
interpreting the operative provision.

All of the cases cited by

both sides in this matter hold that the court must first
ascertain the intent of the testator before determining whether
the phrase

NX

as is necessary" requires examination of the

beneficiary's independent resources.
An excellent discussion of the necessity and method of
determining testamentary intent in analyzing such phrases is
found in the case cited by Ms. Wood, First National Bank & Trust
Co. v. Finkbiner, 416 P.2d 224 (Wyo. 1966).

In that case, the

Wyoming Supreme Court analyzed a testamentary provision similar
to the one in the present case which authorized invasion of
principal M as in [the trustee's] judgment may be necessary" for
the beneficiary's proper care and support.

The Wyoming Supreme

Court made the following salient observations:
The great volume of litigation prompted by clauses
similar to the one here and the struggle courts have
6

with those clauses in order to arrive at the intention
of the grantor demonstrate the ambiguity. Usually, the
divergence in results reached can be attributed in a
large measure to the circumstances surrounding the
creation of the trust. . . . Consequently, we think
there is merit and defend its contention that competent
evidence tending to show surrounding circumstances was
admissible and was entitled to consideration. . . .
Because of the variance in the language of the clause being
interpreted and the differing surrounding circumstances
present in each case, reliance on precedents has its
limitations. Seldom is it possible neatly to package an
invasion clause into a particular class and say that it is
controlled by some categorical general rule. . . .
As we have heretofore indicated, it is the intention of the
grantor that must govern. That is to be ascertained, if
possible, from the context of the trust instrument as a
whole. Every word is to be given effect if that can be done
without defeating the general purpose of the trust. If the
intention of the grantor does not readily appear from the
instrument, then the language used is to be read in light of
the surrounding circumstances. . . .
A narrow and
unreasonable construction that would defeat the purpose
intended by the grantor will not be adopted. Once
ascertained, the intention must govern, provided that the
result reached is not contrary to law.
Id. at 228-29 (citation omitted).

The court must, therefore,

determine the testator's intent by looking first to the language
of the will and then to surrounding circumstances.

The Finkbiner

court applied this doctrine to the surrounding circumstances of
that case and determined that the grantor intended the trust to
benefit his spouse without regard to the spouse's independent
resources.
The other two cases relied upon by Ms. Wood are correctly
decided under these same principles.
7

In In re Estate of

Lindqren, 885 P.2d 1280 (Mont. 1984), the beneficiary was in a
nursing home and was represented by a conservator.

The

conservator had made payments out of her own pocket to support
the beneficiary.

Although need had not been established in the

eyes of the trustee, the principal disbursements were necessary
to reimburse the conservator and maintain the beneficiary in the
nursing home.

The motivation to establish the trust was to

benefit the spouse but not to give her unfettered access to the
principal because of her mental and physical condition.
In Godfrey v. Chandley, 811 P.2d 1248 (Can. 1991), both the
trustee and the beneficiary had adequate wealth.

However, the

terms of the trust are dramatically different from those in the
present case.
principal.

The trust forbade the trustee to invade the

Only the income of the trust was subject to "as is

necessary" restrictions.

The purpose of the trust was clearly

set forth in the will, and was to support the spouse.

The court

attempted first to ascertain the intent of the grantor.
In both Lindgren and Godfrey, the courts looked to the
circumstances surrounding the wills and determined the testator's
intent.

The wills contained provisions similar to the one in

Grant's Will, and the courts, like the Finkbiner court, found the
generic provisions to be ambiguous enough to warrant resort to
extrinsic evidence for interpretative guidance.
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Dunklee v. Kettering, 225 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1950), relied upon
by Mr. Mitchell, was also decided using the same principles.
There, however, the surrounding circumstances demonstrated the
testator's intent that the trustee examine the beneficiary's
independent resources before invading the principal of the trust.
Thus, all of the cases cited by both sides were decided in
accordance with Mr. Mitchell's position.

Mr. Mitchell would,

therefore, request that this Court reexamine this appeal to apply
the Finkbiner rules to consider the circumstances and facts
surrounding the creation of the Will.

By so doing, this Court

will conclude that Grant intended not only to benefit Marge, but
also to preserve the bulk of his Estate for the Remainder
Beneficiaries.
The form of the Will, on its face, as well as those facts in
the record, support Mr. Mitchell's position but were completely
ignored by this Court in drafting the Opinion.

For example,

Marge had abundant assets of her own, and the Trust was
established with two co-trustees in order to safeguard the
principal.

The Court failed to address either of these facts, or

those additional facts set forth in Mr. Mitchell's Reply Brief at
pages 15 through 17, which demonstrate Grant's intent.
Further, other facts and circumstances surrounding the
creation of the Will which are not in the record evidence Grant's

9

intent that most of the Estate be passed along to Mr. Mitchell
and his family, as Remainder Beneficiaries.

For example, Grant

made substantial gifts of money and personal property to Mr.
Mitchell and his family prior to his death.

Mr. Mitchell and

Grant enjoyed essentially a father/son relationship during the
last years of Grant's life.

Accordingly, Grant had genuine

affection for Mr. Mitchell and his family and desired to benefit
them through his Will.
Mr. Mitchell moved the trial court for summary judgment
based on the undisputed fact, which this Court has acknowledged,
that Marge breached her fiduciary duty in failing to fund the
Trust.

In hindsight, Mr. Mitchell now realizes that Grant's true

intent can only be fully ascertained in a plenary evidentiary
proceeding, rather than in summary fashion.

He, therefore,

requests that this Court rehear this appeal in order to remand it
to the Trial Court in order to prevent injustice and avoid
creating precedent without full factual development.

POINT II
THIS COURT'S AWARD OF $2,875.40 IS IMPROPER
This Court, in upholding the Trial Court's award of
$2,875.40 to Marge's estate, has allowed her estate to be
reimbursed twice for that amount.
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This is an error for three

reasons.

First, even under Appellee's position, Marge was not

entitled to take income from the Estate if she was taking
principal to pay for her necessary living expenses.

The Will,

taken as a whole and in light of the surrounding circumstances
and trust law, did not entitle Marge to the income from the
Estate in addition to principal.
Mr. Sims declared in his will that:
[tjhe Trustees shall distribute to her [Mrs. Sims]
without any conditions, ail of the income of said
trust.
The words "without any conditions" are solely meant to place
no limitation on the distribution of income in the event the
income exceeds the amount necessary for her living expenses.

A

fundamental rule of trusts requires the trustees to first
distribute the trust income to the beneficiary and then, and only
then, to distribute so much of the principal to cover any
deficiency in the case where the income is not sufficient.
Assuming the income of the Estate had been sufficient for
Marge's living expenses, the trustees would have been forbidden
from invading the principal.
It is undisputed that Marge withdrew $96,642.55 from the
Estate for her living expenses.

This is all that she was

entitled to under Appellee's theory of the case.

Appellee stated

in the Trial Court that "Grant's intention was to provide his
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wife with the most discretionary use of his money possible by law
. . . [emphasis added]."
Appellee has never maintained that Mrs. Sims was entitled to
the Estate income and, in addition, her living expenses except in
the context of this offset to Appellant's claim.
Second, the figure of $2,875.40 awarded by the Court and
labeled by the Appellee "interest" is not interest on the
certificate of deposit appropriated by Marge.
following history.

The figure has the

Grant's Estate filed a claim against Marge's

estate on May 8, 1993.

Part of that claim was for a cash

deficiency of $52,866.71.

It was made up of seven specific

adjustment items based on an accounting by the accounting firm of
Grant Thornton.

Some were positive, some were negative.

One

item was moved subsequently to a post Marge's death
reconciliation bringing the total claim to $52,875.40.

The major

item on the reconciliation is the $50,000.00 certificate of
deposit.

Ms. Wood merely deducted $50,000.00 from the figure and

labeled the difference, $2,875.00, "interest."

The figure does

not represent interest or income of Grant's Estate.

There is no

support in the record for the proposition that this figure
represents interest.

It is simply a sum of money for which Marge

failed to account.
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One of the six items in the $52,875.40 reconciliation shows
that Marge's estate suffered a cash deficiency in gross income of
$2,652.00 for 1992 which is the total gross income earned of
$13,094.77, less the gross income actually deposited by Marge in
the bank account of $10,438.27.

After this disclosure, Appellee,

Ms. Wood, did not make a claim for income of the Estate or ask
for an accounting of total Estate income for the entire period
between Grant's death and Marge's death.

This implies she did

not believe the Will gave Marge the income for herself and, in
addition, the principal for her living expenses.

The amount of

$2,875.40 should be returned to Grant's Estate even under the
Appellee's theory of the case.

It was not Estate income, Ms.

Wood has not asked for Estate income, and Marge was not entitled
to Estate income in addition to her living expenses.
Finally, there is no evidence on the record that Grant's
Estate gained any income during the time between Grant's death
and Marge's death.

Marge's estate, therefore, is not entitled to

this sum as "interest" or "income" of the Estate, as such did not
exist.

13

POINT III
THIS COURT'S OPINION CREATES PROBLEMATIC PRECEDENT
From a pragmatic standpoint, the Opinion creates dangerous
precedent and makes a destructive inroad into the sanctity and
security of testamentary instructions.

This Opinion will no

doubt be cited in the future to excuse inappropriate behavior by
personal representatives or trustees who wish to substitute their
own desires for those of the testator.

Marge's breach of duty,

carried to a logical extreme, could have been far more damaging
to Grant's Estate and still have been excused under this Opinion.
If, for example, she had been younger and in better health at the
time Grant died, she could have left her money untouched, which
she did, and she could have spent all of Grant's Estate on
travel, entertainment, and luxury purposes.

Based on the record,

the couple lived lavishly, and she could justify these
expenditures of Grant's money as ''maintain [ing] her in the
standard of living that she enjoyed during [Grant's] lifetime,"
as instructed by the Will.

Under this Court's Opinion, that

behavior would be perfectly acceptable, regardless of the fact
that the Trust had never been formed, the co-trustees had never
been appointed, Grant's beneficiaries would be left with nothing,
and Marge's estate, left untouched, would have grown larger by
the day.

Such a scenario is obviously unfair, but it is a
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foreseeable possibility in the future under this Opinion.

This

Court should, therefore, vacate the Opinion and remand the matter
to the Trial Court for further factual determinations, rather
than create such a judicial escape hatch for complete disregard
for testamentary fiduciary duties.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Mitchell respectfully requests
that this Court grant a rehearing of his appeal, and after
reconsideration of the matter, remand it to the Trial Court for
factual determination.
DATED thi s _ j £ )

day of May, 1996.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN/3 MART/NEAU

'im R. Wilson
David L. Pinkston
Attorneys for Appellant, Neil R,
Mitchell
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